|Prof. Yongdae Kim publishes a paper and presents at top-tier international conference USENIX Security 2019|
Prof. Yongdae Kim’s research team published a paper titled "Hiding in Plain Signal: Physical Signal Overshadowing Attack on LTE" at the top-tier security conference USENIX SECURITY in San Jose, California, from August 14 to 16.
The team showed that it is possible to inject malicious broadcast messages at the physical signal level by exploiting a vulnerability, which is that LTE broadcast messages do not verify integrity. In particular, this attack, called SigOver, has shown that it is possible to make practical attacks in commercial networks by exploiting the fundamental weakness that the signals of the same band are merged in the wireless channel without first accessing a fake base transceiver station.
sigOver can successfully attack with 5000 times weaker signal than a fake base transceiver station’s signal, and unlike a fake base transceiver station, a terminal can successfully attack while maintaining a radio connection with an existing network. Also, SigOver showed five new attacks on broadcast messages, including DDoS attacks on mobile networks, sending fake disaster texts, and forcibly removing mobile terminals from the network.
The following link shows a demo version of sigOver attack.